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In 2009, Jayadev and Stiglitz [1] proposed ‘two ideas’ to
increase innovation and reduce pharmaceutical costs and
prices. These were the use of value-based pricing and pro-
moting public funding of clinical trials. Since then, NICE
has tried and not yet succeeded to introduce value-based
pricing, Persson and Jonsson [2] suggest that international
reference pricing should cease, Gilead has made billions
on the basis of exorbitant pricing of new products for
hepatitis C, and prices for new products for cancer are
causing concern even in the US [3]. At the same time,
there has been considerable work on how to promote
research and development to meet health needs in devel-
oping countries [4], the reported cost of drug development
seems to continue to increase [5], the structure of the
multinational industry has changed significantly [6], there
are major area of market failure such as antibiotics, and
investment in public-private partnerships to promote
innovation continues to grow.
Given this complex landscape, this abstract briefly
reviews the current ideas and strategies to promote inno-
vation in pharmaceutical development. It provides a
review of some of the issues about pricing and affordability
of new medicines, and some options for ensuring that
innovation is affordable. These options are likely to require
some significant changes in our current approaches to
negotiating pharmaceutical prices with suppliers, increased
global and regional collaboration as well as increased
transparency about clinical effects that are relevant to
patients, costs of research and development and explicit
consideration of willingness to pay by different countries.
The problem of declining innovation in the pharmaceu-
tical industry has been well described [6]. Trouiller et al.
summarised the problem in 2002 [7], showing how few
molecules had been approved by the FDA that were of
relevance to neglected tropical diseases. The Priority
Medicines for Europe and the World Report in 2004 [8]
was one response, to identify priority products for poten-
tial development by European pharma. The regulatory fra-
mework for orphan drugs in both the USA and Europe
was another mechanism [9] and similarly, the push for
paediatric medicines tried to use incentives (patent protec-
tion) as well as sanctions to encourage needed product
development.
In 2012, the report [4] by the Consultative Expert Work-
ing Group on Research and Development identified a group
of proposals that they considered most likely to promote
innovation in research for products relevant to low and
middle income countries. These were: a ‘Global Framework’
on research and development, open approaches to research
and development and innovation, pooled funds, direct
grants to companies, milestone prizes and end prizes and
patent pools. They made recommendations on how much
they thought countries should contribute to financing
research and development activities, and also suggested that
the WHO should take a coordinating role, including a glo-
bal health research and development observatory.
Another example of promoting innovation may be the
increasing number of public-private partnerships. There
are the well-established entities, such as MMV and DNDi
who have a portfolio of products for malaria and neglected
tropical disease respectively. New products from both are
on the market. Another venture, the Innovative Medicines
Initiative is the biggest public-private partnership to date,
and is also hoping to promote the development of innova-
tive medicines.
But what about the price of the new products?
Prices of new medicines are a global problem. In the
USA, prices of new cancer medicines have risen in real
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terms by 10% per year since 2005 [10], such that the entry
price of recent new molecules – for example, ipilimumab
for melanoma – is now estimated to be USD120,000/
patient/course of treatment – approximately twice the
average annual income. Some perverse incentives in the
US legislation maybe contributing to the high prices, but
mostly they appear to be due to ‘what the market will pay’.
So the medicines for hepatitis C, sofosbuvir and the com-
bination with ledipasvir, marketed by Gilead, have public
prices of USD1,000 per pill in high income countries. We
have estimated that, at this price, the cost of treating even
a small proportion of the total Hep C infected patient
population is unaffordable for most high income countries.
Even medicines for orphan disease, where arguably higher
prices might be justified on the basis of small market
volumes are setting new price records, despite public
funding of a significant proportion of the development
costs in some cases for example, ivacaftor for cystic
fibrosis [11].
In most high income countries, a number of policies
are used to manage prices of medicines and expenditure.
The choice of policy has to be set in the context of the
balance between health and industrial imperatives, but
usually includes some, or all, of: price-setting techniques
(reference pricing, profit ceilings, cost-plus pricing and
value-based pricing), control of supply chain prices and
mark-ups from ex-manufacturer to dispensing, mana-
ging purchasing (through lists, tenders, price volume
agreements and pooling procurement) and price signals,
through co-payments, or premiums to promote generic
completion and prescribing.
In low and middle income countries, although medicine
prices are often reported to be high, there is less control of
the supply chain and use of price setting techniques. As a
result, especially in countries without comprehensive cov-
erage or insurance, out of pocket payments can be cata-
strophic for individuals. While direct evidence of the effect
of pricing policies in LMIC is limited [12], it would seem
reasonable to assume that controlling prices and mark-ups
would have the same effect on price as it does in high
income countries. How to take control of a market is a
much more difficult question.
Newer approaches to managing prices are also develop-
ing. A number of high income countries are using policies
such as ‘risk sharing’, ‘managed entry’, ‘pay for perfor-
mance’ and ‘coverage with evidence development’ [13,14].
The impact on access and prices these types of schemes
will have is not clear, but there are certainly questions to
consider: for example, if measurement of patient outcomes
is required for payment, does that require a separate regis-
try for each disease? And if so, how are the data managed
and analysed? Who decides what will be measured? Who
protects patient privacy and how?
Similarly, the use of confidential rebates and discounts
appears to be increasing [2] such that the public prices
listed are almost meaningless. If prices are negotiated
behind closed doors, what principles are used to ensure
an appropriate or fair price and how should it be done?
Cost-effectiveness thresholds are one approach but can
have a distorting effect if budget impact and affordability
are not explicitly considered.
But the public anger over what is perceived as corporate
greed [15] is likely to push for at least one change, which
is much more transparency about the basis for pricing.
GSK has provided one recent example of transparent cost-
plus pricing, for their new malaria vaccine. Luzzatto et al.
[9] suggest the same principle should apply to prices for
medicines for orphan diseases. Differential pricing has
been tried by Gilead for its products for hepatitis C, but
without consideration of budget impact, which has been
proposed as an alternative [16] or countries’ willingness to
pay. So to be able to afford innovation, we need to change
our approach and bring all of these strategies together: we
need to consider international price negotiation, with fair
profit margins and transparent understanding of all pro-
duction costs, as well as quality use of medicines. Stiglitz
may be right about value-based pricing as a solution – but
the challenge is how to get there.
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